Use of an Arrest as A Pretext for A Search Without A Warrant by Morton, Glenn R.
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 7 Number 2 Article 11 
1-1-1958 
Use of an Arrest as A Pretext for A Search Without A Warrant 
Glenn R. Morton 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Glenn R. Morton, Use of an Arrest as A Pretext for A Search Without A Warrant, 7 Buff. L. Rev. 309 (1958). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol7/iss2/11 
This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ 
University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized 
editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
RECENT DECISIONS
lower federal court decisions upholding the "silver platter" doctrine. E.g., United
States v. Moses, 234 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1956); United States v. White, 228 F.2d
832 (7th Cir. 1956); Jones v. United States, 217 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1954);
Fredericks v. United States, 208 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied 347 U.S.
1019 (1954).
Perhaps the leading case advocating the "silver platter" doctrine is Burdeau v.
McDowell, supra. In that case a private ihidividual committed the illegal search
and seizure. The Court held the evidence admissible, regarding the Fourth
Amendment and the prophylactic rule of evidence set forth in Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) as applicable only where there is federal participation
in the illegal acquisition of such evidence. Thereafter, federal courts found little
reason to differentiate between "state officers" and "private individuals" concerning
illegally obtained evidence.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that while Mr. Justice Frankfurter coifed
the phrase "silver platter" in Lustig v. United States, supra, he reserved comment
on its validity. However, Mr. Justice Murphy, joined by Justices Douglas and
Rutledge, wrote a brief concurring majority opinion stating: "In my opinion the
important consideration is the illegal search. Whether state or federal officials
did the searching is of no consequence to the defendant and it should make no
difference to us." 338 U.S. 74, 80. This expression of views by three Supreme
Court Justices seemed to somewhat tarnish the "silver platter," but its lustre was
again brightened in Irvine v. California, supra, when Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking
for the majority said, "Even this court has not seen fit to exclude illegally seized
evidence in federal cases unless a federal officer perpetrated the wrong." 347 U.S.
128, 136. In the light of these contrary viewpoints, the extemporary comment in
the instant case must be regarded as casting no small doubt on the doctrine's
heretofore generally assumed authenticity.
While popular opinion may question the wisdom of excluding relevant
wiretap evidence, such criticism should be directed to Congress, for a plain
reading of section 605 fully vindicates the Supreme Court's decision.
Richard G. Vogt
Use of an Arrest as a Pretext for a Search Without a Warrant
Narcotic officers, acting solely on the basis of information obtained from a
paid informant, arrested defendant without a warrant of arrest and seized several
ounces of heroin from his person. Upon consideration of a motion to suppress
the evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained, held (2-1): that the
narcotic officers in relying on an informant's tip had reasonable grounds to believe
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defendant was committing a violation of the Federal Narcotics Act so as to effect
a lawful arrest, and heroin disclosed by a search incident to such arrest was
admissible in evidence against the defendant. Draper v. United States, 248 F.2d
295 (10th Cir. 1957).
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution which prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures does not denounce all searches and seizures
without a warrant but only those which are unreasonable. While this constitutional
protection does not undertake to define what is unreasonable, it is well settled that
where a person is legally arrested for an offense, whatever is upon his person or
in his control which may be used to prove the offense may be seized and held as
evidence. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1955). Thus, lawful arrest
becomes an indispensible condition precedent to a closely allied search and seizure
without a warrant. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
The validity of an arrest, depends upon the existence of reasonable grounds
or probable' cause to believe that a crime has been or is being committed.
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
To insure this constitutional insulation for the protection of basic rights, normal
procedure is that the law enforcement agencies apply for a warrant before an
arrest, thereby giving the judiciary a chance to determine whether there is proper
cause for the arrest. Only under extraordinary circumstances are law enforcement
agencies excused from the requirement of first having the judiciary determine the
question of whether there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been or is
being committed. United States v. Walker, 246 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1957).
However, even where the presence of extraordinary circumstances justifies an
arrest without a warrant the basic requirement of probable cause to believe that a
crime has or is being committed remains, and upon this fact the legality of the
arrest will depend. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932). Congress,
in enacting the Narcotic Control Act, adopted these same principles when they
provided: ". . . an agent of the Bureau of Narcotics may make an arrest w:thout
warrant for violations of narcotic laws where such arrested has or is committing
such violation." Narcotic Control Act, 70 STAT. 570 (1956), 26 U.S.C. §7607(2)
(Supp. 1957).
Probable cause has been defined as where the facts and circumstances together
with the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, are such as would lead a
reasonably prudent person to conclude that the law has been violated. Bruner v.
United States, 150 F.2d 865 (10th Cir. 1945). In substance, probable cause means
that there are reasonable grounds to form a belief of guilt which are more than
mere suspicion but less than that which would justify a conviction. Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
RECENT DECISIONS
Since the hearsay exclusion rule is applicable only at the trial, United States v.
Costello, 350 U.S. 359 (1956), the difficulty that arises in the instant case is
whether information obtained from an informer is sufficient to constitute probable
cause as grounds for a warrant or an arrest without a warrant. There are varying
decisions holding that hearsay evidence in the form of an informer's tip may or
may not be sufficient to constitute probable cause. In Worthington v. United
States, 166 F.2d 557 "(6th Cir. 1948), it was held that a federal agent acting on
information obtained from a man who refused to identify himself, did not have
sufficient probable cause to justify an arrest. While in United States v. Bianco,
189 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1951), information obtained from'a known informant
believed to be reliable from past experience was sufficient to create probable cause
regardless of its hearsay character. The crux of these decisions centers around the
reliability of the information so obtained, and information coming from an
anonymous, undisclosed or unverified source is not sufficient. United States v.
LiFat Tong, 152 F.2d 650 (2 Cir 1945). Thus, there is no reason to suppose that
hearsay evidence derived from an informant, like any other evidence, is not com-
petent evidence on which to show probable cause for an arrest, while the weight
to be given its reliability is a matter for the sound discretion of the court in
considering a motion to suppress.
The court in the instant case, aligning itself with the prevailing view,
apparently seemed satisfied that an informer's tip, found to be realiable from past
experience, in and of itself was sufficient to constitute probable cause. In view of
the fact that the arrest was made solely on the basis of a tip entirely uncorrobo-
rated, except by past experience of the informant, this decision seems quite
questionable . It is apparent that the court, influenced by the evidence of guilt so
obtained from the arrest, was in search of a means for circumventing the consti-
tutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the opinion of
the writer, it is impossible to justify such a decision on the ground that evidence
of the crime was found after the arrest or that such action is necessary to enable
a better system of law enforcement. To allow such a gradual whittling away
of our constitutional guaranties would open the door for law enforcement
agencies to use arrests as a pretext to search for evidence of crime and in time
would reduce to a mockery our concept of individual freedom. Therefore, it is
imperative that the judiciary, in determining the validity of an arrest, restrict
themselves to the actual grounds for the arrest without resorting to its fruits in
the guise of expediency and necessity to justify their decision.
Glenn R. Morton
